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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Agency costs, deriving from the separation between ownership and control, affect 
whatever company model. In case of firms with dispersed ownership (the public 
companies), the classic agency conflict regards the relation between shareholders and 
managers.  
In case of family firms the classic agency conflicts are mitigated thanks to reduced 
separation between ownership and control, but there are other types of agency conflicts, 
moreover between family shareholders and minority ones. 
This paper focuses on the relation between agency costs and ownership structure, 
in the specific perspective of minority shareholders, providing a first empirical evidence 
of the proposition that family ownership reduces the agency costs of equity and has a 
negative effect on the equity risk perceived by the market. 
The analysis statistically compares family and non-family firms, sorted from 
Italian listed companies, in any sector with a significant presence of family business, to 
get evidence of family’s ownership impact on equity cost of capital.  
 3
1 Introduction 
 
The high number of big-sized family firms is traditionally one of the most 
known typical features of Italian capitalism, in which publicly held companies are quite 
absent, most companies are closely held, the market for corporate control seems to be 
quite ineffective and entrepreneurial families play a decisive role in the economic 
system performance. 
This paper faces the problem of the relation between agency costs and ownership 
structure. It is a diffused common thinking that listed family firms are less transparent 
of publicly held companies, because of the excessive power of controlling shareholders, 
whose behaviours can be aimed to earn private benefits from the companies, at the 
expenses of minority shareholders, who suffer asymmetric information and ineffective 
control systems. On the other hand, closely held companies, when owned and managed 
by a family, benefit of the natural alignment between management and shareholders’ 
interests, which share the common purpose of creating value in the long run to preserve 
the survivor of the firm from generation to generation. And even if a non family-
member is acting as CEO, management monitoring by family controlling shareholders 
is much more effective than in a large public company without blockholders.     
This paper analyze italian listed companies, comparing between family and non-
family firms and discussing the problems of agency costs and risk for investor, in order 
to take evidence of the impact of family control on these variables, in the specific 
perspective of minority shareholders.   
 
  
2 Objective, scope and hypothesis
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of family ownership 
structure on the risk perceived by investors and, consequently, on the equity risk 
premium asked by the market. This implies the discussion about the effect of family 
ownership on agency costs regarding both the controlling shareholder-minority 
shareholder and the shareholder-manager agency problem.  
We will empirically investigate the Italian case, with an over four years analysis 
on all Italian listed companies, in any sector except for those without a significant 
presence of family firms.  
Our proposition is the following:  
• family ownership reduces the agency costs of equity and has a 
negative effect on the equity risk perceived by the market. 
This paper provides a first empirical evidence for this proposition and represents a 
first partial step in the investigations, with reference to the Italian case, on the relation 
between family ownership, agency costs and equity risk. 
The following paragraphs, after a brief discussion on the model of analysis of 
equity risk and a literature review on corporate governance, agency costs and family 
business, concentrate on the rationale about equity risk and family business and finally 
go through the methodology of the analysis and the empirical results. 
 
 
3 Equity risk 
 
3.1 Introductory notes on equity risk 
 
From the investor’s point of view a business can be represented like an investment 
portfolio, whose value depends on: 
• expected cash flows; 
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• the temporal distribution of expected cash flows; 
• the risk associated to future cash flows. 
Risk is an important element of financial investment decisions. The higher is the 
risk, the higher will be the opportunity cost of an equity investment. The positive 
risk/return relation is a fundamental concept in financial theory and in the theory of the 
firm (Shapiro, 1986). 
Thus, the cost of capital, which is the expected return on a given capital 
investment, can be seen as the sum of the risk free rate of return and an extra return 
compensating for the risk of the investment (risk premium).  
Financial theory faces the problem of how to measure the risk level and how to 
convert this measure into an expected return that compensates for risk. To value a 
company, it is so necessary to estimate the risk premium, that is the level of additional 
return the investor asks for risk-bearing (Damodaran, 1999) 
From a general point of view, risk can be defined in terms of variance of actual 
returns around the expected ones. 
Investment risk can be classified into two components: 
- a specific company’s risk (the diversifiable risk), that is the risk only related to 
a certain specific investment; 
- the market’s risk (not diversifiable risk), generally affecting all investments. 
According to financial theory, only the second component should be rewarded, as 
the first one can be eliminated by diversification. Even if some family entrepreneurs 
don’t adequately diversify their investments, it is possible to assume that financial 
theory is entirely applicable to investors in listed companies. 
 
 
3.2 The cost of equity  
 
When investing in firms, shareholders expect higher return than investing in risk 
free financial assets, and the riskier is the firm the higher should be the return. The 
equity risk premium is then the difference between the opportunity cost of equity (that is 
the minimum acceptable return on common stocks) and the average return on 
government bonds (risk free rate). 
The equity risk premium is, in other words, the rate by which risky stocks are 
expected to outperform risk-free investments. It is one of the most important figures in 
financial economics and it is the main independent variable in asset allocation decisions 
between stocks and bonds (Best, Byrne, 2000).   
One of the most important models to measure the risk and estimate the cost of 
equity capital is the CAPM. This approach assumes that markets are “efficient” and 
expectations are “rational”, so that investors will demand an appropriate level of 
additional return, the risk premium, to hold a portfolio of risky assets instead of a “risk 
free” asset (Mercer, 2003). 
In the CAPM the cost of equity (that is the expected return) can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
Cost of equity = Risk free rate +  (Market Risk Premium)  
 
The beta measures the volatility of a stock return compared to stock market’s 
average return. Through the beta coefficient it is possible to measure how much market 
risk there is in any investment, that is the risk added on by the investment to a portfolio.  
The market risk premium measures the average excess of stock market returns on 
risk free investments return. 
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3.3 The equity risk components 
 
The corporate cost of equity capital is determined in part by the market risk 
premium for equity, that is the amount by which the return on a totally diversified 
stocks portfolio is expected to exceed the risk-free rate.  
Firms equity risk depends on many factors. The most important risk categories 
are: 
• marketability risk; 
• country risk; 
• financial risk; 
• operating risk; 
• agency risk. 
The marketability risk refers to the possibility of suffering forehead losses, in 
terms of price of assets or liabilities disposal, due to the necessity to timely liquidate the 
position. 
The country risk, instead, measures a country’s capacity of meeting its 
obligations in terms of financial liabilities repayment. This is subjected to country’s 
social, economic and political instability. 
Financial risk is the risk related to financial investment decisions and to capital 
structure choices. It refers to the probability of ex-post deviations of final results 
compared with the targets, due to changes in financial market variables.  
Operating risk can be classified in internal and external risk(Locatelli, 
Magistretti, Scalerandi, Carosio, 2001), and is dependent on the turbulence of specific 
competitive environment and on the operating and cost structure of the company. 
Combining these two variables it is possible to distinguish between: 
• internal risks, such as errors in employees’ operating activities, processes 
organisation, employees unfaithfulness, competitive strategies; 
• external risks, such as natural disasters interrupting firm’s activity and 
generating losses, competitive environment evolution. 
The agency risk is a residual component of equity risk, referring to the agency 
relation between the principal, who owns the asset, and the agent, who is delegated by 
the principal to manage the asset. Asymmetric information and costly (and often weak) 
monitoring systems increase, other thing being equal, the variance between expected 
returns and actual returns, consequently increasing performance volatility and risk for 
investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 Corporate Governance and Agency costs: literature review  
 
The recent international corporate scandals have shown the relevance of agency 
costs arising from different ownership structures and corporate governance systems.  
They have emerged very evident in US context, for the case of Enron, Worldcom, 
etc, but also in the European one, and especially for the Italian case (Parmalat, Cirio, 
etc). 
The agency cost problems can be related to conflicts of interest between principals 
and agents and to market and information imperfections that prevent the principal to 
effectively and efficiently monitor the agent..  
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It is obvious that a greater transparency and a more rigorous market discipline 
would help to recover investors trust and confidence in financial markets (Walter, 
2003). 
 
4.1 The agency costs  
  
The “set of contracts” theory of the firm states that the firm can be viewed as a 
nexus of contracts, some of whose are informal agreements and unwritten codes of 
conduct that affect the individual behaviours within and outside the firm (Baker, 
Gibbons, Murphy, 2001). Also the relationship with shareholders represents a contract, 
as such, the equity contract, which can be viewed as a principal-agent relationship. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract in which 
one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) to perform some services on 
his behalf. The principal party will delegate some decision-making authority to the 
agent. 
In this sense, the members of the management team of the company are the 
agents, and the equity investors (shareholders) are the principals.  
The agency problems stem from the impossibility of perfectly contracting for 
every possible action of an agent whose decisions affect both his situation and the 
principal’s one.  
 
In fact, it is assumed that the managers and the shareholders, left alone, will 
attempt to act in their own self-interest and because of this, there is a conflict of interest 
between them, both trying to maximise their own wealth. 
The shareholders, however, can discourage the managers from diverging from 
their interests by devising appropriate incentives for them and then monitoring their 
behaviour. Doing so, unfortunately, is complicated and costly.  
The costs of resolving the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders 
are what is called agency costs. These costs are defined (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as 
the sum of: 
• the monitoring costs beared by the shareholders; 
• the incentive fees paid to the managers.  
Then, the agency costs, deriving from the separation between ownership and 
control and the information asymmetry between owners and managers, can be 
considered as a value loss to shareholders, arising form divergences of interests between 
these two categories of stakeholders (Pagano, Röell, 1998).  
In the financial markets, agency costs will affect investors’ risk-bearing and 
expected return and they will consequently be reflected in a company’s shares price.  
 
 
 
4.2 Agency conflicts theory and moral hazard perspective 
 
A first perspective of agency conflict is based on moral-hazard assumption 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
It is possible to assume that where a single manager controls the firm, his 
incentive to consume private perquisites increases as his ownership stake in the 
company declines. 
This framework is easily applied for companies where ownership structure is not 
fragmented and the majority of the company’s shares are not controlled by corporate 
managers. 
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Managers will choose optimal investments related to their own personal skills; 
these investments increase the value of the firm with the individual manager and 
increase the cost of replacing him, allowing managers to extract higher levels of 
remuneration from the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Moral-hazard problems tend to get bigger in larger firms. In fact, on the one hand, 
large firms attract more external monitoring, on the other hand, the size increases the 
complexity of the firm’s contracting nexus. The result is the increasing difficulty of 
monitoring and, therefore, the increasing cost of monitoring (Jensen, 1986).  
Moral-hazard problems are also related to a lack of managerial effort. As 
managers own smaller equity stakes in their companies, their incentive to work may 
diminish. 
 
 
4.3 The relation between corporate governance and agency costs 
 
As told before, agency costs stem from the separation between ownership and 
control, reflected in the information asymmetry between owners and managers. 
That’s why different ownership structures and corporate governance models 
affect, with important consequences, the type and the level of agency costs.  
The corporate governance mechanisms affecting agency costs can be divided into 
two parts: 
1) internal governance mechanisms; 
2) external governance mechanisms. 
The internal governance mechanisms consist of shareholders meetings, the board 
of directors, independent and non executive directors. 
The external governance mechanisms consist of the capital market, the public 
sector, legislation, and the labour market (Von Nandelstadh, Rosenberg, 2003). 
The historical paradigm related to agency problems is focused on managers-
shareholders agency conflicts, based on the assumption that companies have dispersed 
ownership (Berle and Means, 1932). In this model of firm, normally referred to as 
public company, the main conflicts and agency costs stem from the management’s 
ability to consume private benefits at the expense of shareholders. In this kind of 
companies, where corporate governance is characterised by a great managers leadership, 
shareholders have little incentive to monitor managers. 
This model of governance, known also as the anglo-american model, is 
characterised by high dispersion of voting rights and can induce free riding on control. 
Since single small shareholder only benefits from performance improvements 
proportionally to the share he holds, he can’ t find profitable to produce a big effort for 
management monitoring.  
But public companies are not the only, neither the most diffused corporate 
governance model1.  
As regards ownership and governance structure, it is possible, for the purpose of 
this paper, to distinguish four cases (referring only to publicly traded companies): 
1) the closely held “family company”, in which there is a family (or few families) 
who strictly owns the absolute or relative majority of voting rights; 
2) the openly held “family company”, in which there is a family (or few families) 
with blockholding ownership and significant influence on the board, but it 
does not have the stable control of the company; 
3) the openly held “non family company”, in which there are some shareholders 
(different from a family) with blockholding ownership and significant 
                                                          
1
 
On this topic, La Porta et al. (1999) show that only 36% of large public traded companies 
around the world are publicly held. 
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influence on the board, but none of them has got the stable control of the 
company; 
4) the “public company”, in which no single shareholder has a significant 
influence. 
In the first three types of ownership structure, companies are characterised by a 
concentrated ownership, implying the existence of a blockholder. 
In these case, the traditional agency costs paradigm related to dispersed ownership 
does not fit good. 
For firms with a concentrated ownership structure, the shareholder-manager 
agency conflict becomes less relevant, because shareholders have more incentives to 
monitor managers.  
So, with concentrated ownership, the focal agency cost shifts to the incentives of 
the blockholder and its ability to consume private benefits at the expense of: 
a) minority shareholders; 
b) bondholders.  
When large owners gain nearly full control of the corporation, they prefer to 
generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The same reasoning is valid to analyse how the large 
blockholders’ preference for private benefits impacts on bondholders. 
The firm’s founding and/or controlling family is one of the most important 
categories of large blockholders. It is possible to estimate that family firms account for 
65% to 80% of all business (Gersick et al., 1997); furthermore, 30% of the world’s large 
publicly traded firms are owned by families, although there are different parameters to 
define family firms (Ellul, Guntay, Lel, 2004). 
The family blockholdings are of great importance to understand agency costs 
dynamics in firms with concentrated ownership. They play an important role in 
mitigating and reducing agency costs, thanks to owners-management interests 
alignment.  
In fact, in the closely held family companies, the openly held family companies 
and the openly held non family company, the classic agency problems between 
managers and shareholders are lower due to the reduced separation between ownership 
and control that helps to reduce asymmetric information. 
In these companies, the classic conflict between owners and managers is 
alleviated because of the existence of a major interest in monitoring the manager. On 
the other hand, these ownership structures can generate, as said, other types of agency 
conflicts:  
- firstly, between the family controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders; 
- secondly, between large blockholders and the bondholders. 
Minority shareholders could also include family members that are not part of 
controlling ownership. 
This paper will focus only on the  first kind of agency conflict, in the perspective 
of minority shareholders. 
 
 
5 Family business and Agency costs: literature review  
 
 
5.1 Family business and shareholders-managers agency conflict 
 
As told before, in the large public companies, shareholders have little incentive 
to monitor managers and prevent them from putting their own personal interests first. 
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Instead, in a company with concentrated ownership structure, shareholders with 
a large stake have a grater incentive to play an active role in corporation decisions 
because they have personal benefits form this effort. 
The controlling shareholders take active interest in running the company, by 
choosing the management and directly taking executive positions. In a family controlled 
company, the familiarity and the deep personal knowledge facilitate cooperation among 
family owners and family agents. 
Self-interest is also mitigated by parental altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, 
2003), meaning that parents are generous to the children, taking care of their needs in a 
long term perspective even to the point of sacrifice. 
So that altruism and the long term perspective allow to reduce some of the 
agency problems. 
If the focus moves to the founding and/or controlling families in publicly traded 
firms, empirical evidence confirms a lower divergence of interests between founding 
family shareholders and managers, compared to dispersed shareholders (Anderson, 
Mansi, Reeb, 2002). 
Dalton and Daily (1992) argue that family firms are one of the most efficient 
form of organizations because of little separation between ownership and control 
mitigating the information asymmetry. In fact “family members ……have advantages in 
monitoring and disciplining related decision agents” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Agency costs mitigation is one of the first argument justifying family firms 
existence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
On the one hand, a family-held publicly traded firm could enjoy the benefit of 
lower agency costs thanks to behaviour of firm’s owner-managers; on the other hand, 
even with non family managers, the family company will better monitor managerial 
inefficiencies. This means that the founding family has to choose between managing the 
firm or monitoring non familiar management. 
The best solution could be the appointment of a Chairman related to the family 
(in order to lower agency costs of owner-manager separation) and a CEO, who is a 
professional manager (in order to benefit from the competitive managerial labour 
market) (Randoy, Jenssen, 2003). 
The families who are able to split these roles effectively mitigate agency costs 
associated with hired managers. 
In this sense, families controlled firms are less susceptible to agency costs that 
arise usually in a principal-agent relationship, thanks to the tight relationship (if not 
identification) between the owner and the manager. 
On the contrary, family control can also alter the incentive structure of a firm 
controlling shareholder, generating free riding and different categories of agency 
problems. The main conflict of interest becomes, as said, the one between the 
controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders: the controlling shareholder may 
use his position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders, in the form of special dividends, excessive compensation packages, 
private use of assets, ...).  
Moreover, private family firms have the additional disadvantage of lack of 
liquidity of their equity, in terms of difficulty of access to an efficient and liquid capital 
market, able to guarantee the full marketability of the whole investment of the family 
and of minorities (McColgan, 2001 - Tiscini, 2001). Listed companies suffer less of this 
problem, but it is not absent as listed family companies stocks are usually less liquid 
than non family large companies stocks in which blockholders are institutional 
investors. 
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5.2 Family business and debt agency costs 
 
The debt agency costs are usually addressed in terms of asset substitution or 
risk-shifting problem. 
Literature on the impact of ownership structure on debt agency cost comes to 
different conclusions. Inderst and Mueller (2001), for example, assume that firms with 
dispersed shareholders have lower debt agency cost than those having concentrated 
ownership. They base their assumption on the difference between shareholders and 
managers preferences in investments choices. 
In a leveraged firm shareholders prefer to select risky projects, then it is possible 
to expect that debtholders can rationally anticipate this behaviour and ask a higher cost 
of debt in order to fully charge shareholders with the debt agency costs. 
In fact, bondholders typically insist on monitoring devices to protect themselves 
from risk shifting, in relation with shareholder incentive problem of outside debt. 
Inderst and Mueller find that if shareholders appoint a manager with different 
preferences about investments choices, then the debt agency costs will be alleviated. 
Obviously, such a manager is much more likely to be appointed in dispersed 
ownership’s firms than in concentrated ones. A large blockholder will indeed keep 
management in his hands, not mitigating the debt agency cost (Ellul, Guntay, Lel, 
2004). 
From another point of view, instead, founding family represents a class of 
shareholders with a unique incentive structure and powerful reasons to effectively 
manage a firm. In this sense it should mitigate debt agency conflicts (Anderson, Mansi, 
Reeb, 2002). 
This can be related to two specific family’s interests: 
a) family’s interest in the firm’s long term survival; 
b) family’s concern for its reputation. 
Families’ interest lies in passing the firm as going concern to their heirs rather 
than simply passing wealth (Anderson, Mansi, Reeb, 2002). 
In this sense, the divergence of interests between family bondholders and 
shareholders is potentially lower than in non family firms.  
Secondly, family firms deal with reputation issues regarding the long-term 
external relation with third parties. In fact, third parties are more likely to establish long 
and personal relationship with the same governing bodies and the same people for 
longer periods in family firms than in non-family firms. 
 That’s why the family’s presence allows these relationships to build over 
successive generations (Anderson, Mansi, Reeb, 2002). 
 In this sense, family reputation usually tends to create longer-lasting economic 
consequences for the family firm compared to non-family firms characterised by a 
higher managers and director turnover. 
This kind of stability also mitigates the debt agency costs. 
Even if the shareholders-bondholders agency conflict is not analysed in this 
paper, the arguments above are of great interest also for the study of the controlling 
shareholders-minority shareholders conflict. 
 
5.3 Family business and controlling shareholders-minority shareholders 
agency conclicts 
 
It has been already discussed as family firms are characterized by lower 
shareholders-managers agency costs because of: 
- the coincidence between major shareholders and the key management people, 
in the case of family top management; 
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-  even in case of non family top managers, the much more effective control that 
family shareholders exercise on top managers. 
Minority shareholders benefit of the above mentioned reduced agency costs in 
the shareholders-managers agency conflicts because they can benefit of the natural 
incentive to the long term company’s health of familiar management and, alternatively, 
of the more effective monitoring activity exercised by controlling shareholders on non 
family managers. 
Nevertheless, minority shareholders of family firms can suffer specific agency 
costs in the relation with controlling shareholders or with top management strictly 
controlled by the family. 
We refer, in particular, to the incentive the controlling shareholder has to extract 
from the companies private benefits at the expenses of minority shareholders and also to 
altruism for future generations. 
Even if altruism tempers self-interest and increase loyalty, it can generate other 
types of agency problems. 
For example, altruism can create a sort of automatic mechanism so that family 
members encourage CEOs to use firm’s resources to provide them with employment 
and privileges that they would not otherwise receive. 
We can for example mention special statutory dividends, excessive 
compensation packages, private use of assets of the company. These circumstances 
distract cash flows from the company to controlling shareholders, but not to minority 
ones. 
Altruism can also bias family CEOs perceptions of their employed sons, which 
hampers their ability to monitor and discipline them, meaning that controlling family 
management does not necessarily minimize the agency cost of fractional ownership 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, 2003). 
The investment and payout policy can also generate agency conflicts because 
controlling shareholders have the incentive: 
- to overinvest in the company (lowering the payout ratio) when cash flows 
exceed the financial need for good strategic opportunities; this happens 
because they have incentives to increase company’s size, whose private 
benefits and social standing are positively correlated; 
- to underinvest in the company, when cash flows and family liquidity are 
inadequate to finance a value creating strategy, because they don’t want to 
reduce (or loose) their control over the company. 
The excessive power of key entrepreneurial people also implies low 
transparency of financial information, ineffective control systems and ineffective 
independent directors. This generates information asymmetries between controlling and 
minority shareholders, and a higher agency risk for minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, the market for family owned firms stocks is generally less active 
that that of big non-family firms. Therefore, minority shareholders, who are more 
interested in the liquidity of the market than blockholders, suffer a higher liquidity risk. 
This is the rationale explanation of the “discount for lack of marketability” of small-
sized family listed companies. 
 
5.4 Agency costs and cost of equity capital 
 
Agency problems affect the cost of equity capital (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  
The cost of equity capital is the discount rate of future cash flow to be 
distributed to shareholders (Huang, 2004). In this sense it considers the risk of firm’s 
inability to generate the expected cash flow for shareholders. From the perspective of 
minority shareholders, this risk could be influenced either by operating and financial 
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variables (financial risk, operating risk, …) or by the agency risk related to managers or 
controlling shareholders incentives in extracting private benefits. This often implies a 
reduction of free cash flow distributable to shareholders. For minority shareholders, it 
represents a real cash distraction for the benefit of controlling shareholders or managers. 
Moreover, managers’ and controlling shareholders’ desire to hold on to free cash 
flow, adversely affects the cash payoff distribution to minority shareholders (LaPorta et 
al., 2002; Denis 2001). 
If the cost of capital is affected by agency risk and agency risk depends on 
governance structures (particularly referring to ownership structure), then it could be 
identifiable a significant relation between the cost of capital and ownership structure. 
This relation is analysed distinguishing between family and non family companies in 
order to argue  the effect of family control on cost of capital. 
It is assumed that the cost of equity capital is estimated through the CAPM 
model, in which the only firm-specific variable is the Beta coefficient. For this reason 
we will use the Beta coefficient to express the cost of capital, that is, all other things 
being equal, the company risk perceived by investors.  
We will then investigate the relation between family control (as the most 
important variable expressing agency risk) and the cost of capital (estimated through the 
Beta coefficient), controlling for other relevant variables such as operating costs 
structure, financial leverage, ecc.. 
 
 
6 Research methodology  
 
In order to verify that family ownership reduces the agency costs of equity and 
has a negative effect on the equity risk perceived by the market we used a sample of 
italian listed companies, with Italian Stock Exchange’s classification by sector. In this 
sample we distinguished family and non family firms according to some hypotheses 
discussed below. 
We assume that: 
• financial theory can be also applicable to listed family companies; 
• CAPM model can be used in order to estimated the cost of capital; 
• Beta is used in order to estimate equity risk perceived by the market in the 
perspective of minority shareholders. In fact, beta is influenced only by the 
floating shares, typically owned by minority shareholders. 
 
The analysis will be divided in the following steps: 
1) descriptive analysis of the selected firms and calculation of performance 
indicators; 
2) calculation of mean values of “beta unlevered” for each activity sector; 
3) correlation analysis between family business and equity risk through a 
regression model. 
 
 
6.1 Sample description and model of analysis 
 
The focus of the paper is on the relation between family ownership and the 
related equity risk (measured through beta). 
We divided the firms of the sample in two groups: 
• family firms; 
• non family firms. 
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Family firm definition 
In this paper the term family refers to either the founder’s family or to an 
individual or family that becomes the largest non-insitutional shareholder in the firm 
through the acquisition of a block of shares. 
Previous researches give different family firm definitions. 
Family firm can be defined using the fractional equity ownership of the founding 
family and (or) the presence of family members on the board of directors (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003).  
Villalonga and Amit use nine different definitions of family firm. These range 
goes from the less restrictive one, under which a family or individual owns any amount 
of shares, to a very restrictive definition, under which the family is the largest vote-
holder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers and family directors, and is in 
the second or later generation (Villalonga and Amit, 2004).  
For the purpose of this paper, a company can be defined “family firm” if two 
conditions are respected: 
1) if there is a single shareholder or a single controlling family at least the 20% 
of voting rights, directly or indirectly (this situation refers also to voting 
agreements and voting trust as a device for co-ordination between significant 
shareholders);  
2) if there is at least one member of the family (or a relative in law) with a seat in 
the Board of Directors. 
We also grouped the sample by sector, maintaining the distinction of family 
firms and non family firms. 
The sample includes all Italian listed companies except for: 
- banks, insurance companies and public utilities, for the absence of family 
firms in these sectors; 
- companies listed at the former Nuovo Mercato for the substantial absence of 
true family firms and the different risk structure of these companies. 
For all firms and for an horizon time period of four years (2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004) there have been considered the following parameters:  
- market value of the stock on the 31st of December of each year (font: R&S 
Mediobanca); 
- annual changes in market value (font: Italian Stock Exchange); 
- full market value of the company on the 31st of December; 
- annual reported earnings (font: R&S Mediobanca);  
- the book value of company’s equity (font: R&S Mediobanca); 
- levered beta (source: Sole 24ore); 
- unlevered beta, (calculated on the base of Hamada calculation2); 
- family ownership (source: Borsa Italiana); 
- board composition (source: Companies Corporate Governance Annual Report). 
We have attributed to family firms a “family ownership degree” represented by 
the percentage of stocks hold by the controlling families. We have attributed “zero” to 
non family firms. 
The variables regarding the composition of the Board of Directors are analyzed in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
 
7 Descriptive analysis of the sample and performance indicators 
 
                                                          
2
 Beta unlevered is the result of beta levered multiplied the ratio (equity/rquity+debt). Equity is 
shareholders equity plus stakeholders interests 
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In a first phase of the research we have analyzed some economic variables and 
performance indicators, distinguishing between family and non family firms. 
In particular, we have analyzed the following variables: earnings, revenues, 
market capitalization. 
As concern the earnings, we have calculated the percentage weight of the earnings 
of family and non family firms on the total sample. 
The results are listed below: 
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Earnings trend is not homogenous. In 2001, 2003 and 2004 earnings percentage 
weight of non family firms is about twice the family firms one. In 2002, Family firms 
earnings weight is higher (almost 60%). These data suffer of the volatility of earnings of 
some big companies, whose weight non the total is very high. 
 
Revenues trend for the four years is the following: 
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In this case, the results are quite uniform in the observed period: family firms 
revenues are few less than 30% of the total sample ones. The fact that family firms 
weight is less than 30% on revenues, but more than 30% on earnings is an indication for 
good family firms performance.  
 
At last, capitalization market trend is the following: 
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Family firms market capitalization is about 36/37% of the total sample (versus a 
27%28% weight in revenues). This is another rough indication of good performance for 
family business. 
 
We have also calculated some performance indicators, as ROE, P/BV (price/book 
value), P/E (price/earnings). 
Concerning to ROE, we have calculated the average ROE of family and non 
family firms. The results are listed below: 
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ROE 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Family Firms 8.34% 6.51% 6.89% 10.46% 
Non Family Firms 12.10% 2.72% 6.73% 11.28% 
 
ROE difference between family and non family firms in not uniform during the 
observed period, due to the high volatility of earnings. 
Also P/BV and P/E analysis show, mainly for the same reason, non uniform 
results, as: 
 
P/BV 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Family Firms 16.32 1.59 1.72 1.78 
Non Family Firms 14.47 6.63 1.11 2.30 
 
P/E 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Family Firms 38.46 8.65 16.97 23.37 
Non Family Firms 16.49 35.25 164.35 1.80 
 
 
8 Descriptive analysis regarding Board composition 
 
According to dominant literature, the Board of directors has two main roles: 
controlling role and “service” role3. Both roles become still more strategic in family 
firms, where the Board can integrate some gaps related to family skills. All these 
considerations are important also to analyze family impact on its composition and its 
operations.  
For every firm of the sample it has been, therefore, analyzed the composition of 
the Board of directors, highlighting the presence of owners family members and the 
number of independent directors.  
 
The dimension is one of the classic composition measures of the Board, although, 
it is really difficult to individuate “an optimal” number of directors. It depends, rather, 
on different factors such as: company dimension, ownership structure and so on. 
On the one hand, small Boards can sacrifice the variety of ideas, but on the other 
hand, too big Boards can generate redundancy of information, allowing free-riding 
phenomena and slower decision processes. The following chart shows  
the average number of directors for family and non family firms:  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 On the topic.: Huse M., Rindova V.P., (2001), Stakeholders’ expectations of boards as assets for 
operating in the new Europe: The case of subsidiary boards, Journal of  Management and Governance, 5, 
pp. 153-178; Johnson J. L., Daily C.M., Ellstrand A.E., (1996), Boards of directors: A review and 
research agenda, Journal of Management, 22(3), pp. 409-438;Monks R., Minow N., (2004), Corporate 
Governance, Blackwell Business, Cambridge; Stiles P., Taylor B., (2001), Boards at Work, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; Zahra S.A., Pearce II J.A., (1989), Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: A review and integrative model, Journal of Management, 15(2). . 
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In the period 2001-2004 it can easily be stated that in non family firms Boards are 
bigger than in family ones (almost 10 versus an average of 8.5/8.9 members).  
Moreover, in the group of non family firms the minimum number of directors, 
during the entire period of observations, is always 5; on the contrary, in family firms it 
is 3 in 2001, 4 in 2002 and 5 in 2003 and 2004 (see  the following chart).  
These results confirm the tendency for family firms to create lighter boards not to 
create excessive counterbalance to the decisional power of the family. It is obvious, 
from the other hand, that small Boards involve the risk to take decisions without a broad 
comparison of different perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, in family business with “small boards”, there is a relevant prevalence 
of family members or, however, their strong influence through the position of chairman 
and/or CEO. It can create problems in minorities interests protection. According to 
dominant theories in corporate governance, such problems can be alleviated in greater 
boards with a big presence of non executive and independent directors, although it can 
reduce efficiency and effectiveness in the decisional process.  
7
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One interesting finding is the increase of both average and minimum board size in 
family firms during the observed period. This confirm the increasing attention family 
firms are dedicating to corporate governance best practices. 
 
 
8.1 Role of independent directors  
 
In order to compare board composition in family and non family firms, we have 
also analyzed the presence of independent directors. They are non executive directors, 
without ties and interests with the company, and without personal ties or relationship 
with people who have economic interests in the company.  
Independent directors presence is important for different reasons, such as a deeper 
protection of the various interests in the company; the supply of an external point of 
view and so on. Independence is defined within the board according to the guidelines 
established in the codes of conduct.  
For the purpose of the analysis we have used the information derived from 
corporate governance reports related to “Borsa Italiana” code of conduct4. 
We have calculated the average per cent weight of independent directors in family 
and non family firms, and the results show a higher presence of independent directors in 
the second ones. In fact, as showed in the following chart, in 2001 the independent 
directors in non family firms are little less of 40% and exceed a bit such threshold, in 
the other years of the analysis. Instead in family firms, they are approximately 30% in 
2001, 2002, 2003, and a bit higher in 2004.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The paragraph 3.1 of the “Codice di Autodisciplina di Borsa Italiana” states directors independence 
conditions.  
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The above results show a lower attention of family firms to monitor executives 
power and improve minorities protection through independent directors. Anyway, the 
increasing weight of independent directors in 2004 also confirms the increasing 
attention of Italian family firms to corporate governance best practices.  
For the interpretation of such results, it is necessary to consider that formal 
independent members of the board are not necessarily characterized by full real 
independence because the formal respect of codes of conduct rules is not enough to 
guarantee their independence. In this sense, public available data are not sufficient to 
detect real independence. Anyway, it could be argued than public data overestimate 
independency and that it is possible that in family firms this overestimate be more 
intense because of the informal and social relations that could be present between board 
members and the family. 
 
 
8.2 The Weight of controlling family in the Board of Directors 
 
Moreover it has been analyzed the presence of the controlling family in the Board. 
The weight of family members on the total members of the board is useful to evaluate 
board independence from the controlling family.  
There are at least two reasons to avoid an excessive presence of family members 
in the board:  
1. A big number of controlling family members limits the role of external 
directors. Such consideration does not want to address a lack of skill of 
family members; on the contrary, it wants to show the risk that they seat 
in the board just because they are members of the family; 
2. A big presence of family members limits the independent directors 
potential control and role.  
The per cent average weight of controlling family members in the board is showed 
in the following chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% weight of family members
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In 2001, family members in the board are approximately 33% and they diminish 
till 29% approximately in 2004.  
The results show a large, but not dominant, presence of family members in the 
board. It is also interesting the confirming result of the increasing trend in corporate 
governance best practices adoption by family firms. 
A general consideration regarding this analysis is that either external directors or 
family ones have a big role. In fact family members are important to create value for the 
firm keeping the alignment between management and shareholders’ interests; instead, 
non family members are important in order to improve boards efficiency and 
effectiveness thanks to their professional skills.  
 
 
 
9 Methodology of the analysis of equity cost of capital 
 
The methodology of the analysis has the following steps: 
1) Classification of the companies by ownership structure (family firms/non 
family firms) and by sector; 
2) Calculation of the relevant variables for each company, for each sector and for 
ownership structure (“family/non family”) groups; 
3) Calculation of the mean values of each variable by sector, by ownership 
structure and for the whole sample; 
4) Test with a regression model of the correlation between equity risk and 
familiarity; 
5) Analysis of the results. 
 
Classification of the companies according to ownership structure and sector 
The companies analysed are 107 Italian listed companies on the Milan Stock 
Exchange excluding banks, insurance companies, holdings, public utilities and firms 
listed in the former Nuovo Mercato, due to the nearly absence of family firms and to 
their different core business and risk profile, that would have altered the average results.  
They are classified in thirteen different sectors (according to Borsa Italiana SpA), 
as highlighted in the following table. We assume that companies of the same sector 
have the same level of operating risk. 
 
Table 1: Analysed sectors 
ANALYSIS SECTOR 
Food 
Automotive 
Papery 
Chemical 
Building 
Electronics  
Plants and Machinery 
Different Industrial  
Mineral – Oil 
Textil and cloths 
Distribution 
Media 
Transportation and Turism 
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To check the existence of a controlling shareholder or a controlling family, it has 
been used AIDA database, Mediobanca’s R&S publications and Consob website official 
information. Where missing at the operating company’s level because of holdings’ 
control structures, the presence of a controlling family has been analysed at the top of 
the control chain. 
The data have been integrated with financial information deriving from R&S 
Mediobanca and “Il Sole 24 ore” 
 
Calculation of the relevant variables 
For each company and for each year, the following parameters have been 
calculated: 
1) the unlevered beta; 
2) the price/earning ratio; 
3) the annual change in common stock prices (preferred stock have been 
excluded to guarantee data homogeneity); 
4) the price/book value ratio; 
5) the debt/equity ratio; 
6) external operating costs/sales ratio; 
7) annual stock turnover; 
8) compliance with “Preda Code” in terms of corporate governance. 
 
 
Calculation of mean values 
In order to get a first descriptive analysis of the data, means value of unlevered 
betas have been calculated for each year (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), and on a three years 
average basis, distinguishing for ownership structure and for sector. 
Unlevered betas is used to neutralized the effect of financial risk.. 
 
 
Regression model 
The analysis of coherence with the hypothesis of negative relation between family 
ownership and the equity risk perceived by the market has been conducted through a 
regression model for the three years sample of observations, in order to verify the 
relation between the beta coefficient and the variables of the model. In particular the 
linear regression considers the following variables: 
beta levered as dependent variable; 
sector, family ownership, market capitalization, debt/equity 
(D/E) ratio, annual earnings, external operating costs/sales 
ratio, board size, the number of independent directors as 
independent variables. 
 
The independent variables should express the components of equity risk described 
in the paragragh 3.3. 
(REV N. 3) In particular: 
Agency risks5 are considered as mainly dependent on the following variables: 
family ownership, which is defined as above explained; 
board size, expressed by the total number of members of the board; 
                                                          
5
 Family ownership and family control are not really substitute but they are surely correlated. We 
can assume that family ownership is more significant and comprehensive variable to explain the influence 
of the family in the governance of the company.  (REV.N. 4) 
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the number of independent director, expressing the independence of the 
board in protecting. 
So that family ownership should have a negative correlation with equity risk.   
The number of independent directors should have a negative correlation with 
equity risk 
Marketability risk includes two components: 
size risk, expressed by market capitalization, in the assumption that big 
companies represent more marketable and less risky investment for 
minority shareholders; 
current earning effect expressed by reported annual earnings, in the 
assumption that the bigger current results are, the less the investment is 
risky, because (all other information about the future being equal) 
expected results are considered to be more stable as they are demonstrated 
by current results. 
Market capitalization should have a negative correlation with equity risk. 
Annual earnings should have a negative correlation with equity risk 
Operating risk is considered as dependent on sector and operating structure. It is 
assumed that internalization increases operating risk while externalization reduces it. 
Obviously, operating structure determines the composition of operating costs. 
Consequently, the external costs/sales ratio has been considered to express cost structure 
and to have a negative correlation with operating risk. 
So that external costs/sales should have a negative correlation with operating risk. 
   
The financial risk is considered as dependent on the composition of financing 
liabilities and it is then expressed by D/E ratio.  
So that debt/equity should have a positive correlation with equity risk. 
 
This model is thus aimed to test the correlation between family ownership and 
equity risk controlling for operating risk, financial risk and marketability one. 
 
The regression model can be there represented as follow6: 
 
Levered  = Y + A sector + B family ownership + C market 
capitalization + D D/E ratio + E annual earnings, + F external costs/sales 
ratio + G total number of directors in the board, + H number of 
independent directors 
 
 
Analysis of the results 
The results of the analysis are shown in the following paragraph. 
 
10 Empirical Results  
 
The mean values over the four years show the results of the following tables: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 We have used a longitudinal analysis in order to have a more significant sample of observations instead 
of having a lower number of observations for each year (REV N. 2) 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 
  Beta Beta Beta Beta 
Fonte: ns elaborazione da Sole 24ore) FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB 
Food 0.32 0.51 0.16 0.51 0.33 0.51 0.65 0.48 
Automotive 0.25 0.49 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.44 0.55 0.99 
Papery 0.29   0.17   0.32   0.52   
Chemical 0.21 0.36 0.32 0.53 0.33 0.60 0.56 0.64 
Building 0.38 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.45 0.14 0.56 0.70 
Electronics 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.46 0.58 0.59 0.67 
Plants/machinery 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.49 0.20 0.49 0.54 0.46 
Other industrial 0.00 NC   NC   0.18   0.11 
Mineral-Oil 0.22 0.12 0.26 1.23 0.22 1.21 0.35 0.80 
Textil and cloths 0.38 0.32 0.47 0.13 0.49 0.14 0.69 1.11 
Distribution 0.93   0.71   0.63   0.89   
Media 1.09 0.94 0.98 0.94 1.00 1.02 0.94 0.71 
Turism and Transportation 0.33 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.84 0.65 
Average 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.71 
 
The average “Unlevered Beta” of family firms is always lower than non family 
ones. Analysing each sector, “Unlevered Beta” of the sector is lower for family firms in 
23 cases on 40.  
 
The regression analysis shows the following results: 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
Familiarity, 
D/E , 
Mktcap, 
External 
costs/sales, 
Sector, CdA 
members, 
Earnings,  
Independen
t 
directors(a) 
. Enter 
 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: Beta levered 
 
 
Model Summary 
 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,324(a) ,11 ,083 ,333 
 
 
a Predictors: (Constant),Independent directors , D/E , Mktcap, Sector, External costs/sales, Earnings, total 
members in the board, Family ownership 
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REV. N. 5  
The analysis confirms a negative correlation between family ownership and equity 
risk, in fact the coefficient estimated on familiarity has a negative and significant t-
statistic of –2,17. 
The correlation between Beta and debt/equity ratio is not statistically significant 
and the effect of indebtness is counterintuitive because the results show a negative 
correlation with equity risk. 
The correlation between Beta and annual earnings is statistically significant (high 
value and negative correlation with equity risk). 
The correlation with External costs/sales shows a significant t statistic but the 
effect is counterintuitive (there is a positive correlation while we would expect a 
negative one).  
The correlation with market capitalization doesn’t express the expected “size 
effect” (positive correlation). 
Finally, also the effect of independent directors on cost of capital is 
counterintuitive, because it has a negative correlation with equity risk. 
 
11 Conclusions and further implementations  
 
REV. N. 6 
The results cannot be considered as a fully consistent empirical evidence 
regarding the relation between family ownership and the agency costs of equity of 
Italian listed companies, but they show a first significant evidence regarding the 
negative correlation between the equity risk and family ownership. It means that the 
market considers family firms less risky than the non family ones.  
Although the analysis does not offer a complete empirical evidence, especially 
due to the low “fit” of the model, we think that the paper supports the validity of family 
governance model in big firms. Insofar, economic regulation and governance rules 
strengthening, in the perspective of minority shareholders, is an important way to give 
value to an ownership model that is quite stable and able to guarantee a good 
shareholders protection in the perspective of financial markets development. 
Coefficientsa
,156 ,167 ,931 ,353
3,355 1,270 ,145 2,642 ,009
7,32E-009 ,000 ,099 1,631 ,104
-,002 ,003 -,039 -,747 ,455
-5,6E-008 ,000 -,120 -1,958 ,051
,221 ,114 ,108 1,940 ,053
,017 ,008 ,157 2,194 ,029
,013 ,010 ,090 1,251 ,212
-,126 ,058 -,118 -2,173 ,030
(Constant)
Sector
Mktcap
D/E
Earnings
External costs/sales
Board members
Independent directors
Familiarity
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Beta levereda. 
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Furthermore, the main limitations and further implementations of the analysis are: 
1) the implementation of other variables influencing equity risk in order to 
implement the regression model; 
2) a deeper analysis of the conceptual model and the use of more sophisticated 
and effective statistical tools; 
3) the extension of time-horizon of the analysis;  
4) a more detailed definition of the level of “familiarity” of the company, based 
on effective control power of the family; 
5) the extension of the analysis to other countries. 
 
These aspects could be the main direction of further implementations of our work. 
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